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Abstract
The association between neural oscillations and functional integration is widely recognized in the study of human cogni-
tion. Large-scale synchronization of neural activity has also been proposed as the neural basis of consciousness.
Intriguingly, a growing number of studies in social cognitive neuroscience reveal that phase synchronization similarly
appears across brains during meaningful social interaction. Moreover, this inter-brain synchronization has been associated
with subjective reports of social connectedness, engagement, and cooperativeness, as well as experiences of social cohesion
and ‘self-other merging’. These findings challenge the standard view of human consciousness as essentially first-person
singular and private. We therefore revisit the recent controversy over the possibility of extended consciousness and argue
that evidence of inter-brain synchronization in the fastest frequency bands overcomes the hitherto most convincing scepti-
cal position. If this proposal is on the right track, our understanding of human consciousness would be profoundly trans-
formed, and we propose a method to test this proposal experimentally.
Keywords: neural synchronization; hyperscanning; electroencephalography; EEG; social interaction; human mind;
consciousness
Introduction
In social cognitive neuroscience, a shift toward embodied, enac-
tive, and participatory approaches has started to take place,
moving away from individual brains and focusing on a person’s
interaction with the environment. In the context of social cogni-
tion a ‘second-person’ approach (Hari and Kujala 2009; Dumas
2011; Hasson et al. 2012; Hari et al. 2013; Schilbach et al. 2013;
Redcay and Schilbach 2019) has gained popularity, emphasizing
the interactive nature of human cognition (Szymanski et al.
2017; Varela et al. 2017), and even challenging the individualist
notion of human experience (Thompson 2001; Hari and Kujala
2009; Torrance 2009; Dumas 2011; Kirchhoff 2014; Froese 2018;
Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019).
These approaches open the space for neuroscience to exper-
imentally address the constitutive role of brain-to-brain rela-
tionships in shaping the mind during moment-to-moment
interactions (Hari and Kujala 2009; Dumas 2011; Hasson et al.
2012; Redcay and Schilbach 2019). Important philosophical
topics, such as collective intentionality (Searle et al. 1990), can
therefore be revisited.
However, there is also some notable resistance towards
moving into this uncharted territory. Even the principal archi-
tect of the hypothesis of the extended mind, Andy Clark, has
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remained sceptical about whether this hypothesis can be gener-
alized to ‘the extended conscious mind’ (Clark 2009). For Clark,
the most promising type of argument appeals to dynamic en-
tanglement plus a unique temporal signature, which is based
on a popular class of theories of conscious experience that re-
quire very fine-grained processes of temporal coordination to
bind together meaningful neural activity. Yet he noted the lack
of evidence for such processes operating outside an individual’s
nervous system, and hence concluded that the case for the ex-
tended conscious mind ‘is at best unproven’ (Clark 2009). A de-
cade on from Clark’s influential assessment it has become clear
that the current best evidence from social cognitive neurosci-
ence entails a more optimistic conclusion, with potentially far-
reaching implications about what it means to be human.
Behavioural studies in psychology have consistently shown
that synchrony during joint action (such as rocking, marching,
walking, or dancing) promotes cooperative ability and increases
empathy, liking, rapport, and prosocial behaviour (Hari and
Kujala 2009; Hove and Risen 2009; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009;
Valdesolo et al. 2010; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2011; Mogan et al.
2017). From such studies, it has been suggested that dynamics
of neuronal coupling could play an important role in the emer-
gence of such interactive synchrony (Wilson and Wilson 2005;
Dumas et al. 2011; Hasson et al. 2012). Importantly, the develop-
ment of the hyperscanning technique by Montague et al. (2002)
has allowed for the measurement and analysis of such inter-
brain dynamics (Babiloni and Astolfi 2014; Czeszumski et al.
2020). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), electroencepha-
lography (EEG) or magnetoencephalography (MEG), hyperscan-
ning paradigms simultaneously record the brain activity of two
or more individuals, thus permitting the assessment of neural
activity during real-time social interaction (Babiloni and Astolfi
2014; Czeszumski et al. 2020).
In the past, the brain of only one participant in a group or
dyad would be recorded at a time, obscuring any emerging phe-
nomena of reciprocal embodied interaction (Dumas 2011;
Hasson et al. 2012; Czeszumski et al. 2020). But as Montague very
simply phrased it, ‘studying social interactions by scanning the
brain of just one person is analogous to studying synapses
while observing either the presynaptic neuron or the postsyn-
aptic neuron, but never both simultaneously’ (Montague et al.
2002). Hyperscanning allows for the investigation of neural rela-
tions at the intra- and inter-brain level (Schilbach et al. 2013;
Czeszumski et al. 2020), making it a relevant technique for un-
derstanding the neural basis of social interaction.
Keeping in mind that intra-brain neural oscillations are
known to play a critical role in cognitive processes (since they
represent the precise timing of neural activity Buzsáki 2006;
Sauseng and Klimesch 2008) and, more importantly, that large-
scale phase synchronization has further been proposed as the
neural basis of consciousness (Crick and Koch 1990; Thompson
and Varela 2001; Ward 2003; Engel et al. 2016) (see below),
reports of modifications on the ongoing oscillatory activity of
several individuals due to social interaction (as measured using
EEG-based hyperscanning) have important implications for our
study of human behaviour.
This opinion piece aims to examine findings of EEG-based
hyperscanning studies and highlight the importance of inter-
brain neural synchronization for the study of consciousness.
We discuss findings of brain-to-brain synchronization during
cooperative social interaction, revealing that this phenomenon
is not a general effect of a shared environment, but an emergent
property of specifically social dynamics. This, together with the
subjective reports of social connectedness and engagement that
often accompany said findings, leads to a new outlook regard-
ing the importance of inter-brain neural synchronization in un-
derstanding the nature of human consciousness.
Oscillations, synchronization and
consciousness
Neural oscillations are considered to be causally responsible for
information transfer and integration (Rosenblum et al. 2001;
Herrmann et al. 2016) since they can change the functional
interactions between areas of the brain (Varela et al. 2001;
Buzsáki 2006; Sauseng and Klimesch 2008; Fries 2015;
Bonnefond et al. 2017), most probably through phase synchroni-
zation (Varela et al. 2001; Ward 2003; Buzsáki 2006; Uhlhaas et al.
2009). Since the phase of an oscillation reflects the exact timing
of neural activity (Singer 1993; Buzsáki 2006; Cohen 2014), phase
synchronization—both within and across EEG frequency
bands—represents a window of functional communication and
integration between neuronal populations (Sauseng and
Klimesch 2008).
It is established that cognitive processes require the tran-
sient coalition of several, widely distributed, and interacting
neuronal groups (Thompson and Varela 2001; Ward 2003; Siegel
et al. 2012) and that this large-scale dynamical integration is ac-
complished precisely by phase synchronization of cell assem-
blies (Hebb 1949; Nicolelis et al. 1997; Rodriguez et al. 1999;
Varela et al. 2001; Kelso and Engstrom 2006; Sauseng and
Klimesch 2008; Kelso 2009; Tognoli and Kelso 2009; Fries 2015;
Engel et al. 2016) (of course, synchronization is not the only
mechanism underlying effective cognitive processing; for a dis-
cussion on importance of phase desynchronization, see Tognoli
and Kelso 2009 and Varela et al. 2001). Analogously, the neural
substrates of consciousness may not be localized to a single re-
gion or network of a person’s brain (Kelso 1995; Thompson and
Varela 2001; Engel et al. 2016). Two decades ago, Crick and Koch
(1990) suggested a link between synchronized neural oscilla-
tions and consciousness; today several authors support the
claim that the neural basis of consciousness (specifically of phe-
nomenal consciousness, i.e., the integrated flow of experience
Block 1995) is likely to be at the level of large-scale interactions
over several frequency bands of oscillatory neural activity
(Engel et al. 1999, 2016; Buzsáki 2006; Thompson and Varela
2001; Varela et al. 2001; Ward 2003; Melloni et al. 2007; Uhlhaas
et al. 2009; Revonsuo 2014). For example, Llinás suggested that
our subjectivity is generated by temporally coherent neural ac-
tivity (‘It binds, therefore I am’ Llinás 2001), while Engel and
Singer proposed that neural synchronization could be the
mechanism of different aspects of consciousness, and even
what generates the global unity of the self and the world (Engel
et al. 1999; Revonsuo 2014).
A large number of evidence further suggest that changes in
the patterns of neuronal coherence, both locally and across
regions, may lead to changes in mental functioning and the
contents of consciousness (Engel et al. 2016). Abnormal oscilla-
tory synchronization has not only been associated with condi-
tions such as epilepsy, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s
disease, essential and cerebellar tremors and coma (Schnitzler
and Gross 2005; Buzsáki 2006)—it has also been linked to psychi-
atric disorders like schizophrenia. Both hallucinatory symptoms
and the fragmented nature of these patients’ experience have
been related to a disruption of synchronization (Tononi and
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Edelman 2000; Lisman and Buzsaki 2008; Uhlhaas et al. 2009;
Uhlhaas and Singer 2010; Mellin et al. 2018; Ahn et al. 2019).
As a process crucial for consciousness, oscillations can cut
across brain–body–world divisions, rather than being limited to
neural activity in the head (Thompson and Varela 2001). An in-
teresting and well-known example of their role in guiding cog-
nition and conscious experience in the world is the adjustment
of ongoing neural rhythms to external stimuli, also known as
phase locking (Sauseng and Klimesch 2008). Critical to synchro-
nization by oscillation (Buzsáki 2006), phase locking to external
stimuli has been described as a ‘gating’ mechanism that can
amplify or reduce neuronal responses to the events of an infor-
mation stream (Bonnefond and Jensen 2012). It has also been re-
lated to task performance and conscious perception (Lakatos
et al. 2008; Bonnefond and Jensen 2012; Ronconi et al. 2017;
Solı́s-Vivanco et al. 2018). Therefore, its results are crucial for a
person’s ability to retrieve information about the world and suc-
cessfully interact with her/his environment (Hasson et al. 2012).
In contrast, schizophrenia patients display reduced alignment
of neural activity to external stimuli (Lakatos et al. 2008; Lakatos
et al. 2013), and it has also been proposed that the disconnection
between self and environment in these patients could be due to
this abnormality (Lakatos et al. 2013).
Neural synchronization beyond an
individual brain
The continuous modification of internal oscillatory dynamics is
not limited to an individual’s interaction with the physical envi-
ronment. A growing body of research examining neuronal pro-
cesses in interacting individuals has revealed that social
dynamics also play an important role in neuronal rhythms
(Balconi and Vanutelli 2017; Stevens and Galloway 2017; Mu
et al. 2018). For example, studies have revealed that individuals
on the autistic spectrum disorder, who often have substantial
problems connecting socially (Hari and Kujala 2009; Marsh et al.
2013; Redcay and Schilbach 2019), show a lack of neural syn-
chronization with others (Tanabe et al. 2012; Salmi et al. 2013).
Furthermore, tasks requiring cooperation, coordination and
joint attention in non-clinical individuals demonstrate that
greater inter-brain oscillatory synchronization is associated
with enhanced performance and can predict team efficiency
(Mu et al. 2017; Szymanski et al. 2017; Balconi and Vanutelli
2018), and that tasks with a greater need for cooperation are as-
sociated with a higher level of inter-brain synchronization
(Bezerianos et al. 2015; Mu et al. 2016; Sinha et al. 2016; Mu et al.
2017; Szymanski et al. 2017; Hu et al. 2018).
The behavioural gains associated with higher inter-brain
synchronization subsequently make hyperscanning, and in par-
ticular EEG-based hyperscanning (Hari and Kujala 2009), specifi-
cally relevant for evaluating the neural oscillatory dynamics
associated with social interactions (Liu et al. 2018).
As with other techniques, EEG-based hyperscanning is car-
ried out during a real-time interaction paradigm (Babiloni and
Astolfi 2014). Most commonly the paradigms used include tasks
such as playing guitars in duets (Lindenberger et al. 2009; Sänger
et al. 2012), imitation tasks (Dumas et al. 2010; Yun et al. 2012), vi-
sual search tasks (Szymanski et al. 2017), cooperation–competi-
tion games (Astolfi et al. 2010; De Vico Fallani et al. 2010; Cui
et al. 2012; Sinha et al. 2016; Pan et al. 2017; Hu et al. 2018), verbal
or motor interaction (Pérez et al. 2017), amongst others (for
reviews see: Dumas et al. 2011; Babiloni and Astolfi 2014; Balconi
and Vanutelli 2017; Liu et al. 2018; Czeszumski et al. 2020). Each
member of the group or dyad is instrumented with the desired
scalp electrode channels from separate EEG devices, and all
devices are controlled through an online server (so as to make
sure neural recordings run in parallel). A key advantage of EEG-
based hyperscanning is that it is capable of maintaining high
ecological validity, while capturing changes in the phase rela-
tionship between oscillatory signals of individual brains in the
millisecond range (Mu et al. 2018; Czeszumski et al. 2020).
Inter-brain phase synchronization analysis under this tech-
nique uses adapted versions of intra-brain estimators, such as
the Phase Locking Value (PLV) (Lachaux et al. 1999), Inter-brain
Phase Coherence (IPC) (Lindenberger et al. 2009), and Partial
Directed Coherence (PDC) (Astolfi et al. 2010). While PLV and IPC
are measures of similarity between neural signals, PDC is used
to estimate causal links between brains (Czeszumski et al. 2020).
Other measures used include the Circular Correlation
Coefficient (Ccorr), Coherence (COH) measure, Pearson’s
Correlation Coefficient, Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient,
Total Interdependence (TI, and Wavelet Transform Coherence
(WTC). Each estimator has advantages and limitations (Burgess
2013; Czeszumski et al. 2020); if used properly, they can reveal
the existence of a functional relationship between neural sig-
nals of individual brains.
The functional meaning of inter-brain
synchronization
‘True’ synchronization occurs when two oscillators reciprocally
adjust their ongoing rhythms due to interaction, serving as a re-
liable marker of information flow between the elements of a
system (Rosenblum et al. 2001; Burgess 2013). Thus, and this is
key, inter-brain phase synchronization of neural activity poten-
tially indicates functional integration across brains.
Nevertheless, ‘false’ synchronization between brain signals
might appear, such as when oscillators are driven by an exter-
nal influence, or when there is a coincidental phase relationship
between individual rhythms. Therefore, careful consideration
must be taken before formulating conclusions about their ex-
planatory power (Burgess 2013). Induced synchrony (as opposed
to true synchronization) could occur when participants are ex-
posed to the same perceptual stimulus or exhibit similarity of
movements, even without actually interacting with one another
(Kaneshiro et al. 2020). Therefore, it can be difficult to conclude
if synchrony is due to similar dynamics of individual brains
driven by a shared perceptual context or if it is an emergent
property of social interaction.
Fortunately, most hyperscanning studies today do not sim-
ply measure phase synchronization between individuals but
compare it between different experimental conditions. To con-
trol for induced synchrony, experimental conditions remain
identical in every way possible, except for one where partici-
pants are socially engaged and another when they are not
(Burgess 2013). Many studies additionally use random pair
analysis to account for spurious synchronization due to a
shared environment (Osaka et al. 2015; Toppi et al. 2016). This
analysis compares brain signals from real pairs of subjects
(from those who did interact during the task) with signals from
‘random’ or ‘non-pairs’ (from pairs generated randomly based
on their role in the task and not the actual pair they were a part
of). By doing so, only the emergent neural synchronization that
was due real interaction survives the analysis (Bilek et al. 2015;
Osaka et al. 2015; Toppi et al. 2016).
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True synchronization is associated with
cooperation
Besides revealing that synchronized brain activity is neither due
to a shared environment (Dikker et al. 2017) nor to similarities in
stimulus input or motor output (Sänger et al. 2012; Pérez et al.
2017), EEG-based hyperscanning studies show that functional
links appear across participant’s brains during cooperation, but
not during competition or individual—yet simultaneous—task
performance (De Vico Fallani et al. 2010; Mu et al. 2016; Sinha
et al. 2016; Mu et al. 2017; Szymanski et al. 2017; Balconi and
Vanutelli 2018a, b) (note that this link is not only observed with
EEG-based hyperscanning; see Box 1). For example, pilots and
co-pilots in flight simulations (where the environment remains
the same, but the need for cooperation varies throughout the
task) exhibit high inter-brain connectivity during cooperative
phases (takeoff and landing); such interconnections break down
during cruise, when the two participants act independently
(Toppi et al. 2016). Another clue that such findings are not due
to confounding factors (Burgess 2013) but are instead a marker
of real synchronization, connectivity between random couples
proved non-significant compared to real couples (Toppi et al.
2016). More interestingly, non-cooperative interactions can be
predicted during the decision-making phase of a computerized
cooperation–competition game, where individuals can either
decide to cooperate, defector choose a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy (pun-
ish the other player for previous non-cooperative behavior).
Prior to making the decision, defector couples already show sig-
nificantly less inter-brain connectivity than couples playing co-
operative or tit-for-tat strategies (De Vico Fallani et al. 2010).
Interestingly, it has been suggested that this task requires a
higher understanding of the other’s intentions when partici-
pants decide to cooperate or punish (Czeszumski et al. 2020).
Additionally, not only does cooperation foster inter-brain
synchronization; it appears that believing you are ‘part of the
same team’ has also an effect on hyper-connectivity. In a study
with four participants playing a card game in two competing
teams (where, to control for motor activity, experimenters as-
sisted the participants on moving the cards), strong functional
connectivity was observed between subjects belonging to the
same team, but not between subjects from different teams
(Astolfi et al. 2010). Similarly, pairs exposed to a context that
represents an in-group threat have higher levels of inter-brain
synchronization during a coordination task than those exposed
to out-group threats or in-group no-threat control conditions.
Importantly, this connectivity only appears when pairs are re-
quired to coordinate with a human partner and not a computer
(Mu et al. 2017).
Moreover, a recent study revealed that participants playing a
cooperation game face-to-face exhibit differences in brain-to-
brain synchronization when they believe they are interacting
with each other compared to when they believe their interac-
tion is with a computer. In this experimental setup, the prompts
‘your partner is a human’ and ‘your partner is a computer’ were
provided before each condition (human–human or human–ma-
chine), and every dyad went through both conditions in the
same session. Even though in both conditions the interaction
was with the partner, believing otherwise had a strong effect on
hyper-connectivity (Hu et al. 2018). This may reflect the effects
of different levels of engagement (Schilbach et al. 2013).
If, under correct experimental setups, hyperscanning studies
are revealing reliable markers of oscillatory synchronization,
then it appears that, just as in an individual brain, the dynamics
of neural activity during interaction could provide functional in-
tegration between the interacting parts—across brains (Kelso
and Engstrom 2006; Stevens and Galloway 2016, 2017; Stevens
et al. 2017). This is supported by one of the most interesting, yet
lesser explored aspects of EEG-based hyperscanning studies: an
association between inter-brain neural synchronization and
participants’ conscious experiences related to social cohesion.
Inter-brain synchronization and subjective
experience of social closeness
Although several experimental paradigms do not explicitly take
into account participant’s experience (Balconi and Vanutelli
2017), those that do have yielded interesting results. First, feel-
ings of cooperativeness between participants appear to mediate
the level of neural synchronization during cooperation (Hu et al.
2018). Additionally, feelings of engagement, affinity, empathy
and social closeness can be predicted by the level of inter-brain
synchronization (Dikker et al. 2017; Bevilacqua et al. 2019).
Neural synchronization across pairs is also negatively associ-
ated with an individual’s reported attachment anxiety (Kinreich
et al. 2017) and experience of pain, while it is positively associ-
ated with accurately rating another person’s pain experience
(Goldstein et al. 2018). Interestingly, the feeling of another per-
son’s touch or pain has been repeatedly reported in intra-brain
Box 1. Beyond EEG
The type of results described in this article is not limited
to the EEG-based hyperscanning technique; MEG, fMRI
and fNIRS hyperscanning studies reveal similar findings.
Reviewing them all is beyond the purpose of this work.
However, we recognize their importance in providing a
more complete picture of the brain’s activity during social
interaction and emphasize the relevance of future multi-
modal recording and analysis.
Of particular relevance for oscillatory dynamics, fNIRS-
based hyperscanning studies, which do not directly
register electrical dynamics but can uncover locally
phase-locked neural behaviour, show that higher inter-
brain neural synchronization is observed when, for exam-
ple, participants play a computer game side by side and
are required to cooperate, but not when they are required
to play against each other (Cui et al. 2012).
The pioneering study by Funane et al. (2011) revealed
that the spatiotemporal coherence of inter-brain signals
in paired participants was associated with cooperative
performance. Participants were instructed to mentally
count to 10 after an auditory cue, and then simulta-
neously press a button. When the brain-activity patterns
during the counting period were more synchronized, the
time interval between their button-presses was shorter, a
result not explained in terms of a motion artefact.
Greater neural synchronization also appeared between
subjects completing a puzzle together, compared to when
the same subjects completed identical puzzles individu-
ally, or watched others complete the puzzle (in front of
them or through video recording) (Fishburn et al. 2018). A
similar study revealed inter-brain synchronization be-
tween two individuals when singing together, but not
when singing individually yet close to each other (this ef-
fect was not observed in random pairs) (Osaka et al. 2015).
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studies, where a person’s own affective pain circuitry is acti-
vated while viewing another person receive painful stimuli
(Hari and Kujala 2009). More importantly, shared pain experi-
ence has also been related to self-other confusion (Derbyshire
et al. 2013) and appears to be absent in people in the autistic
spectrum disorder (Minio-Paluello et al. 2009), which further
supports brain-to-brain synchronization as a mechanism for
sharing a social world (Hasson et al. 2012).
Moreover, the nature of the association between participants
has an effect on neural synchronization (Pan et al. 2017) and the
context under which it appears. During naturalistic nonverbal
social interaction (gaze and positive affect), inter-brain neural
synchronization appears selectively among romantic couples
and not among strangers (this result is unrelated to other fac-
tors, such as verbal communication) (Kinreich et al. 2017).
These findings, summarized in Table 1, are consistent with
behavioural studies that reveal that movement synchronization
plays an important role in social cohesion (McNeill 1997;
Valdesolo et al. 2010; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2011) and is associ-
ated with higher levels of empathy (Goldstein et al. 2017), less
sensitivity to pain perception (Cohen et al. 2010) and experien-
ces of self-other merging (Rabinowitch and Knafo-Noam 2015;
Novembre et al. 2016; Galbusera et al. 2019)—on being ‘on the
same wavelength’ with someone (Hari and Kujala 2009). More
importantly, the changes in an individual’s conscious experi-
ence of social closeness that accompany hyper-connectivity are
relevant for understanding the interactive nature of human cog-
nition within a ‘second-person neuroscience’ (Schilbach et al.
2013; Varela et al. 2017) and can have important implications for
our understanding of the social dimension of human conscious-
ness and for better treating its disorders (Schilbach 2016; Redcay
and Schilbach 2019).
Beyond individualist theories of consciousness
If the basis of consciousness is at the level of large-scale interac-
tions of neural oscillatory activity (Crick and Koch 1990;
Thompson and Varela 2001; Varela et al. 2001; Ward 2003; Engel
et al. 2016), the modifications of oscillations that appear during
meaningful social interaction—and their relation to the experi-
ences of social closeness—result in a shift in our understanding
of human consciousness. Although a still debated proposal
(Clark 2009, 2012; Ward 2012; Kirchhoff 2014; Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019), an ‘extension of consciousness’ could be possi-
ble in light of these findings.
Enactive and participatory approaches to social cognitive
neuroscience view cognition as an interactive process, challeng-
ing the individualist notion of the human mind (Clark and
Chalmers 1998; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Torrance 2009;
Kirchhoff 2014; Varela et al. 2017; Froese 2018; Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019). These approaches establish the association be-
tween an individual, the world and others in terms of non-
linear interactive dynamics (Beer 2000; Froese and Ikegami
2013). The boundaries that distinguish self from other, instead
of being fixed and hard won, are under constant renegotiation
(Clark and Chalmers 1998; Kirchhoff 2014; Kirchhoff and
Kiverstein 2019); they are observed as a result of self-organizing
processes, which can also occur at a social level depending on
the nature of the interaction (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007;
Galbusera et al. 2019). Interestingly, the inter-brain synchroniza-
tion found—at least in the studies considered in Table 1—does
not appear to have an overall frequency-, region- or task-
specificity. This potentially places embodied interpersonal in-
teraction in general as playing a fundamental role in shaping
joint experience and moves social cognition away from the
head (Thompson and Varela 2001; Froese and Ikegami 2013).
Considering this, the impact of meaningful social interaction
on individual’s self-organizing processes (i.e. ongoing neural
oscillations) and, more importantly, the appearance of true
phase synchronization between brains (a key coordination vari-
able between interacting dynamical systems Kelso and
Engstrom 2006) support the suggestion that when several
agents interact, a form of social self-organization could take
place, with properties irreducible to the individuals (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo 2007; Froese et al. 2014; Galbusera et al. 2019).
Consequently, the boundaries consciousness could also be un-
der renegotiation during meaningful social interaction.
The main objection to this argument, put forward by Clark
(2009), is that consciousness cannot extend outside an individ-
ual brain since it requires processes occurring on such a fast
temporal scale that neural activity proves to be the only ade-
quate ‘vehicle’. Moreover, the person’s body will act as a ‘low-
pass filter’, ultimately ‘screening off’ all non-neural body and
environmental elements from being part of the material real-
izers of conscious experience. Therefore, entering signals can
only play a casual, yet not constitutive, role (Clark 2009).
First, to be clear, when referring to an ‘extension of con-
sciousness’, we are not suggesting that consciousness does not
have any neural basis. Human consciousness requires mecha-
nisms occurring within the brain (Thompson and Varela 2001;
Engel et al. 2016); nevertheless, neural activity is also embodied
in an individual’s interaction in and with the world (Buzsáki
2006; Noë 2009), including with other people (Hari and Kujala
2009). More importantly, inter-brain neural synchronization, as
revealed through EEG-based hyperscanning studies, appears in
all oscillatory frequency bands, including the faster gamma fre-
quency (Astolfi et al. 2010; Dumas et al. 2010; Kinreich et al. 2017;
Mu et al. 2017). There is therefore no empirical reason to limit
the basis of conscious experience to very fast neural activity oc-
curring within a single brain.
Additionally, communication within a single brain uses the
hierarchical nesting of oscillations, where faster frequencies are
embedded in, and modulated by, slower rhythms (Buzsáki 2006;
Buzsáki and Draguhn 2004; Bonnefond et al. 2017). This line of
reasoning can be extended to the even slower timescales of em-
bodied action in the world (Haken 1980; Kelso 2009; Van Orden
et al. 2012; Haken 2013). In this sense, even if the body acted as a
‘low-pass filter’, it remains possible for embodied social interac-
tion to work as a slower rhythm in which neuronal oscillations
become nested across two or more people (Hasson et al. 2012),
and thus foster ‘interpersonal synergies’ (Riley et al. 2011;
Hasson et al. 2012).
By eliminating Clark’s frequency-based objection, we pro-
pose that the boundaries of the conscious mind could also be
subject to constant renegotiation during an individual’s interac-
tion with his/her environment and with others, pointing to a
mechanism that neurally binds us together and opens us up to
an extended conscious mind in social interaction (Kelso and
Engstrom 2006). An upshot of this proposal is that it can poten-
tially validate our most intimate experiences: when we become
aware that ‘we’ are sharing a moment with someone else, it is
no longer necessarily the case that we are fundamentally sepa-
rated by our distinct heads—we could really be two distinct
individuals sharing in one and the same unfolding experience
(Froese 2018).
The consequence of Clark’s claim that fast temporal integra-
tion of neural activity delimits the basis of consciousness, when
viewed from the latest hyperscanning evidence, is that this

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 | Valencia and Froese
basis can indeed become extended across two brains during so-
cial interaction. For Clark, and for us, this is a constitutive claim,
not a causal claim. Importantly, this does not necessarily mean
that individual perspectives will be obliterated and merged into
a single supra-individual perspective (Stapleton and Froese
2015). We propose that the fact that the basis of an individual’s
perspective now integrates some neural activity from another
person’s brain provides a suitable explanation for the qualita-
tive experiential transition from a purely first-person perspec-
tive to a second-person perspective, which is also sometimes
referred to as the ‘we’ perspective (Zahavi 2015). If this proposal
is on the right track, then there could be a genuinely collective
basis to collective intentionality (Searle et al. 1990), thereby
overcoming difficulties stemming from the individualist as-
sumption of traditional theories in philosophy. There are also
experimental consequences: presumably, the larger the cross-
brain neural integration, the larger the qualitative sense of shar-
ing an experience together, and this could potentially be tested.
Testing the hypothesis: a possible
experimental setup
We have proposed that inter-brain phase synchronization of
neural oscillatory is a candidate mechanism for the conscious
extended mind, potentially explaining the known association of
synchronization with the feeling of being together with some-
one else. Although consciousness is notoriously difficult to in-
vestigate scientifically, here we suggest that our proposal could
be experimentally tested through transcranial alternating cur-
rent stimulation (tACS). Arguably, the best method known to
date that assesses the causality of brain oscillations in human
cognition (Cohen 2014), tACS can directly modulate the ongoing
rhythms of neural activity in an individual brain by passing an
electrical current between two electrodes placed on the scalp,
entraining specific oscillations and thereby influencing cogni-
tive processes ( Cohen 2014; Zaehle et al. 2010; Helfrich et al.
2014; Herrmann et al. 2013 ) and large-scale network dynamics
(Ali et al. 2013).
When used in individual brains, this method has been
reported to induce changes in subjective experience (Meiron
and Lavidor 2014), such as self-awareness (Voss et al. 2014). In
addition, its therapeutic applications on individuals with disor-
ders of consciousness, such as on patients with schizophrenia,
are already demonstrated (Kallel et al. 2016; Mellin et al. 2018;
Ahn et al. 2019). These findings support this method’s relevance
for investigating the extension of consciousness during social
interaction.
From the available literature it appears that simultaneous
brain stimulation, or hyper-tACS, is associated with an en-
hancement of interpersonal movement synchrony (Novembre
et al. 2017). In a study conducted by Novembre et al. (2017), in-
phase 20 Hz stimulation across two individuals’ motor cortices
enhanced behavioural synchrony in a joint finger-tapping task,
compared with anti-phase or sham stimulation. This was seen
even after controlling for stimulus induced synchronization and
performing random pair analysis (Novembre et al. 2017).
Under a setup of social interaction similar to those utilized
in the aforementioned EEG-based hyperscanning studies (where
true synchronization between participant’s brains takes place
(Burgess 2013), hyper-tACS could be used to either enhance or
diminish pre-existing inter-brain synchronization during a co-
operative task to study its effects on the participant’s subjective
experience of social connectedness and engagement. We expect
that hyper-tACS conditions that foster brain-to-brain synchro-
nization during cooperative action would lead to higher experi-
enced cohesion, compared to hyper-tACS conditions that
inhibit neural synchronization across participant’s brains.
tACS-EEG co-registration is still in its early stages, but prom-
ises to ‘open a new frontier in oscillatory brain rhythms investi-
gations’ (Feurra et al. 2012). Even though there is no established
hyper-tACS/EEG method to date, it has proven an effective
method for manipulating on-going inter-brain phase synchroni-
zation during joint action (Novembre et al. 2017; Szymanski et al.
2017). However, results are still inconclusive. As opposed to
Novembre’s study, Szymanski et al. (2017) found that only dy-
adic performance asynchrony, compared to dyadic synchrony
and individual synchronization to a metronome, was modu-
lated by hyper-tACS. Due to tACS dependence on the power of
individual endogenous oscillations at the targeted frequency
(Ruhnau et al. 2016), this study’s electrode placement left room
for individual differences within each dyad, so unique dyad dif-
ferences might have resulted in an unprecise inter-brain phase
synchronization.
Further hyper-tACS studies, with more precise stimulation
protocols, are needed in order to ensure that oscillations in the
same frequencies are synchronized in the brains of individuals
engaged in social interaction (Szymanski et al. 2017). Only then
could the subjective experience of social connectedness be ma-
nipulated in a valid experimental setup. If this turned out to be
the case, it would establish inter-brain neural synchronization
as the basis for the conscious extended mind, at least for situa-
tions where it matters most—during meaningful social
interaction.
Conclusion
An influential position in the philosophy of mind articulated by
Clark had appealed to the lack of empirical evidence regarding
very fast binding processes outside the nervous system to con-
clude that the possibility of the conscious extended mind is at
best unproven. As we have shown, the current evidence no lon-
ger supports such a sceptical assessment. With these theoreti-
cal doubts removed, we conclude that the time is right to
marshal the best contemporary hyperscanning practices in cog-
nitive neuroscience in order to move beyond the still wide-
spread traditional assumption that all aspects of consciousness
are necessarily private and first-person singular. It is time to
bring the sciences of the mind in line with the social nature of
human experience.
Conflict of interest statement. None declared.
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